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We introduce in this work an extension of the model of games with probabilistic graphs arising in Calvo et al. (1999,
Math. Soc. Sci. 37, 79), which itself generalizes the one developed by Myerson (1977, Math. of Oper. Res. 2, 225) for games
with communications restrictions. In the first of these models, each pair of nodes has a given probability of direct commu-
nication. In this paper a more general setting is considered: we suppose that a probability distribution over the set of all
possible communication networks among the players is given. A generalization of the Myerson value is defined and char-
acterized in this context.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The analysis of social or economic networks has become especially relevant because the outcome of many
social or economic interactions is heavily influenced by the bilateral relations among the different actors in the
network. For instance, the economic results of many airlines depend on their alliances, the exchange of goods
in non-centralized markets is based on the network of relations among sellers and buyers and, in relationship
marketing, networks also play an important role as the basis of this approach is the set of relations among
clients, enterprisers and consultors.
The seminal analysis of social and economic networks from a game theoretical point of view is due to Myer-
son (1977). He introduced a new framework, joining a cooperative game to another mathematical system, a
deterministic graph, representing the channels of cooperation that are really open to the players in the game.
Then, the game reflects the economic possibilities of the different actors and the network represents the restric-
tions in cooperation. In this setting, he defines a new game, the graph-restricted game, now known as the0377-2217/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2007.06.040
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work. Moreover, he proves that the Shapley value of this new game (now called the Myerson value) can be
characterized in terms of two properties: efficiency in connected components and fairness. Later, Myerson
(1980) obtained another characterization using in this case the efficiency in connected components and a
new property, the balanced contributions.
The Myerson approach to the study of interactions among players is obviously richer than the classical one
based only on cooperative games and applies to a wider class of situations. Nevertheless, there are many other
real situations in which the consideration of the network structure as a given and fixed one can be viewed as a
restrictive assumption. In these cases, it seems to be reasonable to take into account not only a network but
alternative structures that might have formed. In our approach, we suppose that the network is not built up,
but there are several alternative potential networks. The resulting allocation rule will depend on the values of
these different alternatives. This approach is not entirely new.
In Calvo et al. (1999), the Myerson model is generalized to a probabilistic setting in which all possible net-
works among players are considered and the probability of each of them is computed assuming that each pair
of players has some probability of direct communication. The probabilities of different links are considered as
independent. A natural extension of the Myerson value is defined and characterized in terms of its properties:
component efficiency, fairness and balanced contributions.
Jackson (2005) emphasizes the idea that the value of the alternative networks (not necessarily sub-net-
works) should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. Taking this
idea as a starting point, he presents a family of allocation rules, establishing a connection between classical
cooperative theory and network games, including a procedure for importation of classical solution concepts.
The approach we propose focuses on the different possible networks and their likelihood as the unit of
study, instead of thinking of the networks as the result of independent and bilateral relations. The importance
of removing the independence assumption in the bilateral relation should not be underestimated. In real net-
works this lack of independence has attracted the attention of researchers in the last few years. For example, it
is unreasonable to assume independence in so-called information networks, the citation network of academic
papers or the world wide web. The same in genetic regulatory networks, with edges representing dependence of
proteins production and the proteins in the vertices. For more details, see Newman (2003).
Some features that seems to be common to networks of many different types and show the existence of
dependence in the relations are:
• The small-world effect. The fact that a large amount of pairs of vertices in most networks seems to be con-
nected by a short path trough the network.
• Transitivity. In some networks it is found that, if node 1 is connected to node 2 and node 2 to node 3, then
there is a heightened probability that node 1 will also be connected to node 3. In colloquial language: the
friend of your friend is likely also to be your friend.
• Incompatibilities. In many social, economic or political interactions the presence of a link between two per-
sons, enterprises, or political parties automatically excludes the possibility of a relation between one of
them and a third actor.
As an example, suppose the existence of two countries R and G without a common frontier, R being a pro-
ductor of natural gas and G a consumer. They are trying to build a pipeline to transport the gas from R to G.
Imagine there are two possibilities to establish this connection. One of them is a direct link from R to G under
the sea. The other pass through a third country P which have frontiers with both R and G. The described
framework should produce two alternative networks: RG and RPG. The direct network RG is considerably
more expensive, but avoids the introduction of a veto player P. Whatever the a priori probabilities we assign
to each network, these probabilities can not be obtained from the corresponding ones of the links RG, RP and
PG and the independence hypothesis.
In this paper, we will consider the usual framework in which players in a cooperative game have restrictions
in communication possibilities. But we will suppose that these restrictions are reflected in a set of different pos-
sible networks. Formally, the different graphs with nodes set the set of players are the values of a discrete ran-
dom variable whose probability function informs us over the likelihood of the possible alternative networks
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probabilities of different links and the independence hypothesis as in Calvo et al. (1999). In fact, under the
proposed framework, the setting in Myerson can be viewed as the degenerate case in which only one network
is possible and the probabilistic approach given in Calvo et al. (1999), as the particular one in which only cer-
tain probability distributions on the set of possible networks are allowed (those in which such probabilities are
obtained from the independence hypothesis).
In this new setting, we define a natural extension of the Myerson value and we prove that this allocation
rule can be characterized in terms of its properties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to introduce the preliminaries and
some notation. In Section 3, we define the new framework: the generalized probabilistic communication sit-
uations, the induced game and the Myerson value for this setting. Through Section 4, we explore some prop-
erties of the restricted game. Two characterizations of the defined value are given in Section 5. Moreover, in
this section, we explore the extent to which some popular properties of allocation rules for graph restricted
games are satisfied. The paper finish with some remarks in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Let N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng be a finite set of players. A game in characteristic function form (a coalitional game or
a TU game) is a pair ðN ; vÞ where v (the characteristic function) is a real function defined on 2N, the set of all
subsets of N (coalitions), that satisfies v(;) = 0. For each S 2 2N ; vðSÞ represents the economic possibilities of
players in S. GN will denote the class of all coalitional games with players set N. When there is no ambiguity
with respect to N, we will refer to the game ðN ; vÞ as v. A game v in GN is super-additive if, for all coalitions
S; T  N , with S \ T = ;, v(S [ T) P v(S) + v(T) holds. Moreover, v is convex if, for all coalitions S; T  N ,
v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) P v(S) + v(T) holds.
Another important class of games is the one of balanced games. To define these games we will note, for
each S  N, eS for the indicator vector of the coalition, i.e., eSi ¼ 1 if i 2 S and 0 otherwise. A map
B:2Nn{;}! [0,1] is balanced if
P
S22N nf;gBðSÞeS ¼ eN . Then, it is said that ðN ; vÞ 2 GN is a balanced game
if, for every balanced map B,
P
S22Nnf;gBðSÞvðSÞ 6 vðNÞ holds. We will say that (N,v) 2 G
N is totally balanced
if it is balanced and all its subgames ðS; vjS Þ, S  N are balanced as well.
A very used solution concept for TU games is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) which, for each





½vðS [ figÞ  vðSÞ;s and n being the cardinalities of S and N, respectively.
The Shapley value is linear and can be computed using the so-called unanimity games. Given N a set
of players and S 2 2N n{;} a coalition, the unanimity game ðN ; uSÞ has characteristic function uS(T) = 1 if
S  T and uS(T) = 0 otherwise. For a fixed N, the set {uS};5SN defines a basis in GN and then, for all v 2
GN, we have v ¼
P
;6¼SNDvðSÞuS . The coefficients Dv(S) can be calculated using the formula:DvðSÞ ¼
X
TS







eS:We will use another solution concept for v 2 GN. This is known in the literature as the core and, in general,
does not give a single allocation and even can be empty. It is defined by:CðvÞ ¼ x 2 Rn
X
i2N
xi ¼ vðNÞ and
X
i2S
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areva (1963) and Shapley (1967).
A graph or a (social or economic) network is a pair (N,c), N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng being a finite set of nodes and c
a collection of links (edges or ties), that is, unordered pairs fi; jg with i; j 2 N . ðN ; dÞ is a subgraph of ðN ; cÞ if
d  c. We will denote CN the class of all networks with nodes set N. When there is no ambiguity with respect to
N, we will refer to the graph ðN ; cÞ as c.
If fi; jg 2 c, we will say that i and j are directly connected in c. We will say that i and j are connected in c if it
is possible to join them by a sequence of edges from c. A graph ðN ; cÞ is connected if any two nodes i and j in N
are connected in c. A subset S of N is connected in (N,c) if the partial graph ðS; cjS Þ is connected, cjS being the
set of those links fi; jg 2 c where both i and j are elements of S.
Given a graph ðN ; cÞ, the notion of connectivity induces a partition of N in connected components. Two
nodes i and j (i 5 j) are in the same connected component if and only if they are connected. By connected
component we mean what is also known as a maximal connected subset. N/c denotes the set of all con-
nected components in c and more generally, for each S  N, S/c is the set of all connected components
in the partial graph ðS; cjS Þ. We will denote ciðN ; cÞ ¼ fj 2 N=j ¼ i or j connected to ig the element of N/c
to which i belongs. If ciðN ; cÞ ¼ fig we will say that i is an isolated node. Obviously, the graph ðN ; cÞ is
connected iff jN/cj = 1. For each i 2 N, Li(c) will denote the set of links in c incident on i, i.e.,
Li(c) = {{i, j}/j 2 N and {i, j} 2 c}. Removing those links of c incident on i, we obtain the subgraph of c,
ci = cnLi(c). A graph is complete if all pairs of nodes are directly connected in the network. We will
denote KN the complete graph with nodes set N. Note that a graph with nodes set N is both, an element
in CN and a subset (or subgraph) of KN. A cycle in network ðN ; cÞ is a circular path that does not use any
player more than once. Formally, it is a sequence of ordered players ði1; i2; . . . ; it; itþ1Þ; t P 3 such that
fik; ikþ1g 2 c for all k 2 f1; 2; . . . ; tg; itþ1 ¼ i1, and where i1; i2; . . . ; it are different. A network ðN ; cÞ is
cycle-complete if for every cycle in the network, the complete graph on the players forming this cycle is
a subgraph of ðN ; cÞ.
A communication situation is a triplet ðN ; v; cÞ; ðN ; vÞ being a game in GN and ðN ; cÞ a graph in CN. No
particular relation is assumed between the game v and the graph c, other than the nodes in the graph being
the players in the game. Given a communication situation ðN ; v; cÞ, Myerson (1977) introduced the graph
restricted game ðN ; vcÞ. Its characteristic function vc is defined by:vcðSÞ ¼
X
T2S=c
vðT Þ; S 2 2N ;vc(S) representing the economic possibilities of players in S taking into account the available communications.
An allocation rule for communication situations is a function W : CN ! Rn, CN being the set of all commu-
nication situations with nodes set N. WiðN ; v; cÞ represents the utility payoff that player i expects in the game
ðN ; vÞ under the restrictions in communication imposed by the graph c.
Different allocation rules can be obtained applying different concepts of solution to the game ðN ; vcÞ. In this
paper we will restrict ourselves to u, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). The Shapley value of the game ðN ; vcÞ
is known in the literature as the Myerson value of the communication situation ðN ; v; cÞ. It will be noted as
lðN ; v; cÞ.
Calvo et al. (1999) extend the model of Myerson to the case in which it might be more appropriate to model
cooperation in a probabilistic way. They define a probabilistic graph as a pair ðN ; p̂Þ, p̂ being a function that
assigns to each link fi; jg in KN a probability p̂ðfi; jgÞ. This probabilities are assumed to be independent. They
call to a triple ðN ; v; p̂Þ a game with a probabilistic graph. In Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001) this triple
is called a probabilistic communication situation.
Such a function p̂ and the independence assumption induce a probability distribution p on CN (the class of






ð1 p̂ðfi; jgÞÞ; c 2 CN :
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In a more general case we will consider an arbitrary probability function p defined on CN that should be
interpreted as follows: for each c 2 CN, p(c) gives the probability that the links between the nodes in N are
those in c. Obviously, p must satisfy:pðcÞP 0 for all c 2 CN and
X
c2CN
pðcÞ ¼ 1:The set of those graphs c 2 CN such that p(c) > 0 will be noted Sp.
The pair ðN ; pÞ will be referred as a generalized probabilistic graph. We will denote PN the set of all general-
ized probabilistic graphs with nodes set N.
The notion of connectivity can be extended to generalized probabilistic graphs in the following way: two
nodes i and j are directly connected in ðN ; pÞ 2 PN if there exists c 2Sp such that fi; jg 2 c. We will say that
i; j are connected in ðN ; pÞ if there is a sequence fi1 ¼ i; i2; . . . ; ir ¼ jg  N such that ik,ik+1 are directly con-
nected in ðN ; pÞ for all k ¼ 1; . . . ; r  1.
The notion of connectivity in ðN ; pÞ induces a partition of N in (probabilistic) connected components. Two
nodes i and j; ði 6¼ jÞ are in the same connected component if they are connected in ðN ; pÞ. The set of all con-
nected components in ðN ; pÞ will be noted by N/p. Note that N=p ¼ N=cp; cp being the deterministic graphS
c2Spc.
Let us observe that two nodes can be in the same (probabilistic) connected component in ðN ; pÞ even if there
is no (deterministic) graph ðN ; cÞ in Sp in which this two nodes are connected. The following example illus-
trates this situation.
Example 3.1. If N ¼ f1; 2; 3; 4g; c1 ¼ ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg; c2 ¼ ff3; 4gg and pðc1Þ ¼ pðc2Þ ¼ 12; then N=p ¼ fNg.
Each generalized probabilistic graph ðN ; pÞ induces 2 n2ð Þ generalized probabilistic subgraphs ðN ; pnÞ 2 PN ,
one for each n 2 CN, where:pnðcÞ ¼
P
dKN nn




A generalized probabilistic subgraph ðN ; pnÞ can be interpreted as follows: only deterministic subgraphs c of n
are considered, giving pn a probability for each of them. This probability, pn(c), is computed as the sum of the
probabilities that p gives to those graphs in CN having in common with n the links in c, i.e.:pnðcÞ ¼
P
g2CN ;g\n¼c




The (generalized probabilistic) subgraphs ðN ; pKN nnÞ and ðN ; pKNnfig Þ will be denoted as ðN ; pnÞ and ðN ; piÞ,
respectively.
A generalized probabilistic communication situation is a triplet ðN ; v; pÞ, ðN ; vÞ being a game in GN and ðN ; pÞ
an element of PN .
As in the deterministic case, it is possible to associate with each generalized probabilistic communication
situation ðN ; v; pÞ a new game (induced or restricted) ðN ; vpÞ, vpðSÞ representing the (expected) economic pos-







cðSÞ 8S  N :Let GN be the class of all generalized probabilistic communication situations with nodes-players set N.
An allocation rule for generalized probabilistic communication situations with nodes-players set N is a func-
tion W : GN ! Rn that associates a vector of payoffs to each generalized probabilistic communication
situation.
Fig. 1. Liberal-conservative political spectrum.
Fig. 2. Graph c1 = {{1,2},{2,3}}.
Fig. 3. Graph c2 = {{2,3},{3,4}}.
Fig. 4. Graph c3 = {{2,3}}.
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referred as the probabilistic Myerson value.1
Definition 3.1. Let ðN ; v; pÞ be a generalized probabilistic communication situation. Then, the probabilistic
Myerson value of ðN ; v; pÞ is defined as follows:1 Let
commlðN ; v; pÞ ¼ uðvpÞ:
The next proposition, whose proof is straightforward and will be omitted, relates the Myerson value in the
current model to those of all possible deterministic communication situations.
Proposition 3.1. For each generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ we have:lðN ; v; pÞ ¼
X
c2CN
pðcÞlðN ; v; cÞ:In order to clarify and motivate our approach, let us consider the following example.
Example 3.2. In a given parliament, there are members of four parties: 1, 2, 3 and 4, the respective percentages
being 25%, 30%, 30% and 15%. For special types of bills to be passed, at least 2/3 of votes are required.
Suppose parties 1, 2, 3 and 4 are aligned in an ideal political spectrum left-right or liberal-conservative as in
Fig. 1.
Parties 2 and 3 form a stable coalition that governs reaching ad hoc agreements with the extreme parties in
the political spectrum. Because of the ideological incompatibility of parties 1 and 4, these agreements are
sometimes established with 1 and in other occasions with 4, but never with both simultaneously.
Thus, gathering the above ideas, it is estimated that the relative frequencies of these different agreements (c1
and c2 in Figs. 2 and 3) are 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. And with probability 0.1 parties 2 and 3 cannot obtain
any collaboration with the rest, as in the graph c3 in Fig. 4.us note that a (deterministic) communication situation ðN ; v; cÞ can be viewed as the particular generalized probabilistic
unication situation ðN ; v; pÞ in which p is a degenerate probability distribution with pðcÞ ¼ 1.
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v(S) = 1 if s P 3 and 0 otherwise, and p(c1) = 0.6, p(c2) = 0.3, p(c3) = 0.1. Then, the (probabilistic) Myerson





































4. On the properties of the induced game
In this section, we study some of the main properties of coalitional games and how restrictions in the com-
munications imposed by a generalized probabilistic graph influence these properties.
The structure and most of the ideas in this section are taken from Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001,
pp. 53–81), that study the deterministic case.
4.1. Superadditivity
The first result shows that, for all probabilistic graph ðN ; pÞ, the superadditivity of game ðN ; vÞ is inherited
by ðN ; vpÞ.
Proposition 4.1.1. Let ðN ; pÞ be a graph in PN and ðN ; vÞ a game in GN. If ðN ; vÞ is superadditive, then the
restricted game ðN ; vpÞ is superaddtive as well.
Proof. Owen (1986) showed that, for any c 2 CN, the superadditivity of the game ðN ; vÞ is inherited by the
network restricted game (N,vc). ðN ; vpÞ is a convex linear combination of those games (N,vc) with c 2Sp
and then, it is superadditive too. h
Let us turn now our attention to the inheritance of the balancedness and totally balancedness properties.
4.2. Balancedness and totally balancedness
The following proposition states that connectedness of all non-trivial networks with positive probability in
the generalized probabilistic graph ðN ; pÞ is sufficient to guarantee the inheritance of balancedness property.
Proposition 4.2.1. Let ðN ; pÞ be a graph in PN . The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) for all c 2Sp; c is connected or empty.
(ii) for all balanced game ðN ; vÞ, the game ðN ; vpÞ is balanced as well.
Proof. Suppose (i) holds. Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001, th. 3.2, pp. 56) prove that, if c is a connected
or empty network in CN, then, for all balanced game ðN ; vÞ, (N,vc) is also balanced.
Moreover, from the definition of balancedness, it trivially follows that any linear convex combination of
balanced games is balanced as well. Then, because of the hypothesis on Sp, if ðN ; vÞ is balanced, then vp is a
convex combination of balanced games and thus balanced.
Now assume that (ii) holds. Suppose that (i) does not hold and let be:Dp ¼ fcigi¼1;...;r Sp
the family of non-empty graphs in Sp that are not connected. Consider the game ðN ; vÞ defined by:vðSÞ ¼
1 if s ¼ 1;
0 if 1 < s < n;
n if S ¼ N :
8><
>:The game ðN ; vÞ is balanced as the vector (1,1, . . . , 1) is trivially in its core.
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(a) jN=cij < n, as ci 5 ; and



































pðcÞ ¼ 1:Obviously, there exists no x ¼ ðx1; x2; . . . ; xnÞ 2 Rn satisfying
P
i2N xi ¼ vpðNÞ < n and xi P 1 for each i 2 N.
Hence, the core of ðN ; vpÞ is empty and the game ðN ; vpÞ is not balanced. This contradicts (ii) and then (i) must
to hold. h
Turning now our attention to the totally balancedness property we have the following result.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let ðN ; pÞ be a generalized probabilistic graph and ðN ; vÞ a TU game. If ðN ; vÞ is totally
balanced then ðN ; vpÞ is totally balanced.
Proof. Van den Nouweland (1993) showed that, for each c 2 CN and for each totally balanced TU game
ðN ; vÞ, ðN ; vcÞ is also totally balanced. Also, for each S  N ; ðS; vpjSÞ is the TU game ðS; vP KS Þ and thus, its char-
acteristic function is a convex linear combination of characteristic functions vcjS for c  KS. As a convex linear
combination of balanced games is a balanced game, ðS; vpjSÞ is balanced for all S  N and then, ðN ; vpÞ is a
totally balanced game. h4.3. ConvexityProposition 4.3.1. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN and such that, for all c 2Sp; c is a cycle-complete graph. Then, if ðN ; vÞ is a
convex TU game, ðN ; vpÞ is also convex.
Proof. Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) proved that, for all cycle-complete graph ðN ; cÞ and for all con-
vex game ðN ; vÞ, the graph-restricted game ðN ; vcÞ is also a convex game. In our context, and by hypothesis,
ðN ; vÞ is a convex game and, for all c 2 Sp, c is cycle-complete. So, we can guarantee that vp is a convex linear
combination of convex games vc and then, also convex. h
Proposition 4.3.2. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN such that it exists c 2Sp, c not cycle-complete. If p(c) is high enough, then
there exists a convex TU game ðN ; vÞ such that ðN ; vpÞ is not convex.
Proof. Again in Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) it is proved that, for a network that is not cycle-com-
plete, it exists a convex game such that the associated network restricted game is not convex. Moreover, the
authors give a constructive proof that we adapt to our context.
If c 2 Sp is not cycle-complete, then there is a cycle ðx1; x2; . . . ; xk; x1Þ in c and i; j 2 f1; 2; . . . ; kg such that
i < j 1; fxi; xjg 62 c and fxm; xjg 2 c for all m 2 fiþ 1; . . . ; j 1g. Consider the convex game ðN ; vÞ with
v(S) = s  1 for all S  N ; S 6¼ ;. Define S ¼ fxi; xiþ1; xjg and T ¼ fx1; . . . ; xkg. Note S, T and Tn{xi+1} are
connected in c, while Sn{xi+1} is not. It follows that:
D. Gómez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 539–556 547vcðSÞ  vcðS n fxiþ1gÞ ¼ vðfxi; xiþ1; xjgÞ  vðfxigÞ  vðfxjgÞ ¼ 2 > 1 ¼ vðT Þ  vðT n fxiþ1gÞ
¼ vcðT Þ  vcðT n fxiþ1gÞ:Then:vpðSÞ  vpðS n fxiþ1gÞ ¼ pðcÞ½vcðSÞ  vcðS n fxiþ1gÞ þ
X
d2Sp ;d6¼c




pðdÞ½vdðSÞ  vdðS n fxiþ1gÞ;and similarly:vpðT Þ  vpðT n fxiþ1gÞ ¼ pðcÞ þ
X
d2Sp ;d6¼c
pðdÞ½vdðT Þ  vdðT n fxiþ1gÞ:Therefore:vpðSÞ  vpðS n fxiþ1gÞ > vpðT Þ  vpðT n fxiþ1gÞ ð1Þ
if and only if:pðcÞ >
X
d2Sp ;d6¼c
pðdÞ vdðT Þ  vdðT n fxiþ1gÞ  vdðSÞ þ vdðS n fxiþ1gÞ
 
: ð2ÞMoreover, for all d 2Sp; d 6¼ c:vdðT Þ  vdðT n fxiþ1gÞ  vdðSÞ þ vdðS n fxiþ1gÞ 6 k  1;and so, the right-hand side of inequality (2) is upper bounded by:X
d2Sp ;d6¼c
pðdÞðk  1Þ ¼ ½1 pðcÞðk  1Þ:Therefore, a sufficient condition for (1) holds is pðcÞ > ½1 pðcÞðk  1Þ, or pðcÞ > k1k . h4.4. Core inclusion of the Shapley value
In the current section, we study conditions on a generalized probabilistic graph that guarantee the inher-
itance of the property that the Shapley value belongs to the core.
Proposition 4.4.1 states that the inheritance of this property is guaranteed when the underlying generalized
probabilistic graph ðN ; pÞ is such that Sp ¼ f;;KNg. We first introduce a lemma that trivially holds.
Lemma 4.4.1. Let ðN ; vÞ and ðN ;wÞ be two games in GN with non-empty cores. Then, if a; b 2 Rþ and
x 2 CðN ; vÞ; y 2 CðN ;wÞ, then we have:axþ by 2 CðN ; avþ bwÞ:Proposition 4.4.1. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN such that Sp ¼ f;;KNg. Then, for every game ðN ; vÞ with uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ, it
holds that uðvpÞ 2 CðN ; vpÞ.
Proof. From the previous lemma and the fact that, for every game ðN ; vÞ with uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ and for c = ; or
c ¼ KN ;uðvcÞ 2 CðN ; vcÞ, the proof of this proposition is straightforward. h
The following propositions explore the remaining cases, in which there exists a graph c 2Sp with c 5 ;
and c 5 KN. In general, in these cases, we cannot guarantee the inheritance of the aforementioned property.
Proposition 4.4.2. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN such that there exist c 2Sp, c 5 ;, c not connected. Then it exists a TU
game ðN ; vÞ with u(v) 2 C(N,v) and uðvpÞ 62 CðN ; vpÞ.
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1 if s ¼ 1;
0 if 1 < s < n;
n if S ¼ N :
8><
>:Then uðvÞ ¼ ð1; 1; . . . ; 1Þ trivially belongs to CðN ; vÞ. As in the proof of Proposition 4.2.1, it follows that
CðN ; vpÞ ¼ ; if ðN ; pÞ is such that there exist c 2 Sp, c 5 ;, c not connected. And so, in this particular situa-
tion, the core inclusion of the Shapley value property is not inherited. h
Proposition 4.4.3. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN such that it exists a connected but not cycle-complete graph c1 in Sp. Then, if
p(c1) is high enough, there exist a TU game ðN ; vÞ such that uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ but u(vp) 62 C(N, vp).
Proof. Suppose c 2 Sp is connected but not cycle-complete. Then, Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001)
prove that it exists a TU game ðN ; vÞ such that uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ but uðvpÞ 62 CðN ; vpÞ.
They give a constructive proof of this result finding a game ðN ; vÞ (an unanimity game which depends on c1)
and a coalition S ˆ N such that:X
i2S





















i2SuiðvpÞ if and only if:pðc1Þ >
P







ð3ÞRecall ðN ; vÞ is an unanimity game and then, for all c 2 Sp, c 5 c1:X
i2S










: Proposition 4.4.4. Let ðN ; pÞ 2 PN such that it exists a cycle-complete but not complete graph c1 2Sp. Then, if
p(c1) is high enough, there exists a TU game ðN ; vÞ such that uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ but uðvpÞ 62 CðN ; vpÞ.
Proof. Suppose ðN ; pÞ 2 PN and c1 2Sp, c1 being a connected cycle-complete but not complete graph. Fol-
lowing Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001), if c1 is connected cycle-complete but not complete, then there
exist two nodes i; j 2 N that are not directly connected in c1. Moreover, there exists a unique shortest path
between i and j. Take three consecutive points on this path. Without loss of generality, let us note them 1,
2 and 3. It holds that c1jf1;2;3g ¼ ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg. Define v ¼ u12  u13  u23 þ 3u123, where uS denotes an una-
nimity game. Then uiðvÞ ¼ 0 for all i 2 N and it is easy to see that uðvÞ 2 CðN ; vÞ. Because
vc1 ¼ u12  u23 þ 2u123, it follows that u2ðvc1Þ ¼ 13 < 0 ¼ vc1ð2Þ and thus, uðvc1Þ 62 CðN ; vc1Þ.




















c) 6 1 for all c 2Sp, a sufficient condition for (4) is:pðc1Þ > 3ð1 pðc1ÞÞ or pðc1Þ >
3
4
: 5. Two characterizations of the probabilistic Myerson value
This section is devoted to characterizing the probabilistic Myerson value from its properties: component effi-
ciency, fairness and balanced contributions. Moreover, we prove the stability of this value.
An allocation rule for generalized probabilistic communication situations satisfies the component efficiency
property if the total payoff for the members of a (probabilistic) connected component equals its expected
worth. Formally,
Definition 5.1. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn is component efficient if, for all ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN and all C 2 N=p,
it holds that:X
i2C
WiðN ; v; pÞ ¼ vpðCÞ:Remark 5.1. Component efficiency property in the deterministic case is only a particular case of the above
definition, in which there are c 2 CN such that p(c) = 1 and then, N/p = N/c and vp = vc.
The fairness property for deterministic communication situations states that if the possibility for direct
communication between two players i and j disappears, other things been equal (i.e.: the network changes
to another one in which the link l ¼ fi; jg is removed), then the payoffs of both players change by the same
amount.
In this new context, the natural generalization of the fairness property states that, when changing from a
generalized probabilistic graph to the generalized probabilistic subgraph obtained removing the link l, the
effect for both players is the same.
Definition 5.2. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn is fair if, for any link l ¼ fi; jg; i; j 2 N and all ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN ,
the following holds:WiðN ; v; pÞ WiðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼ WjðN ; v; pÞ WjðN ; v; pflgÞ:Remark 5.2. Two special cases of the previous definition are:
• The deterministic case. Consider the generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ in which
p(c [ {l}) = 1 for a particular c 2 CN with l 62 c. Note that p{l} is then a degenerate probability distribu-
tion with p{l}(c) = p(c [ {l}) + p(c) = 1.
• The probabilistic communication situations case. The fairness property for the case of probabilistic com-
munication situations defined in Calvo et al. (1999) can be viewed as a special case of the above definition.
Effectively, when the framework change from the probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; p̂Þ to
ðN ; v; q̂Þ, where q̂ðkÞ ¼ p̂ðkÞ if k 5 l for a given link l ¼ fi; jg and q̂ðlÞ ¼ 0 (i.e.: the probability of direct
550 D. Gómez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 539–556communications between two players i and j vanishes, other things remaining equal), then the induced gen-
eralized probabilistic communication situation (N,v,q) coincides with ðN ; v; pflgÞ and thus, because of the
Definition 5.2, the payoffs to both players i and j change by the same amount.
An allocation rule for the deterministic case satisfies the balanced contributions property if the harm that
the isolation of player i can inflict upon player j is the same as the harm that isolation of player j can inflict
upon player i.
In our framework, the isolation of a player i can be interpreted as the change from a given generalized prob-
abilistic graph ðN ; pÞ to the generalized probabilistic subgraph ðN ; piÞ.
Definition 5.3. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the balanced contributions property if, for all
ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN and all i; j 2 N :WjðN ; v; pÞ WjðN ; v; piÞ ¼ WiðN ; v; pÞ WiðN ; v; pjÞ:Remark 5.3. It is possible again to particularize the previous definition in order to obtain the balanced con-
tributions property for the deterministic and the probabilistic cases.




pðck [ dÞ ¼ pðck [ LkðcÞÞ ¼ pðcÞ ¼ 1:• The probabilistic communication situations case. Given a probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; p̂Þ,
the isolation of a fixed node i is equivalent to the change to ðN ; v; q̂Þ, where q̂ðlÞ ¼ 0 if i 2 l and q̂ðlÞ ¼ p̂ðlÞ
otherwise.
So, the q̂-induced generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; qÞ is such that ðN ; qÞ ¼ ðN ; piÞ












ð1 q̂ðlÞÞ ¼ piðnÞ;and analogously for player j.Theorem 5.1. The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfying component efficiency and
fairness.
Proof. To prove that the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency, let ðN ; v; pÞ be a generalized probabi-
listic communication situation and C 2 N=p. Then, because of the linearity of the Shapley value:X
i2C























uiðvcÞ:As C 2 N/p, for each c 2Sp, C is a union of (deterministic) connected components of N in c, i.e.:C ¼
[rðCÞ
k¼1
T k;cðCÞ; with T k;cðCÞ 2 N=c for all k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; rðCÞ:For each one of these components Tk,c(C), the efficiency in connected components of the (deterministic) Myer-
son value guarantees that:X
i2T k;cðCÞ
uiðvcÞ ¼ vðT k;cðCÞÞ










vðT k;cðCÞÞ ¼ vcðCÞ:Therefore, from the definition of vp:X
i2C









pðcÞvcðCÞ ¼ vpðCÞ:To prove fairness, let us consider a generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ and a fixed link















c2CN ; l 62c
½pðcÞþpðc[flgÞuiðvcÞ:And so:liðN ; v; pÞ  liðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼
X
c2CN ;l 62c
pðc [ flgÞ½uiðvc[flgÞ  uiðvcÞ ð5ÞBy the fairness property for the deterministic case:uiðvc[flgÞ  uiðvcÞ ¼ ujðvc[flgÞ  ujðvcÞ;for all c 2 CN with l 62 c, and thus:liðN ; v; pÞ  liðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼
X
c2CN ;l 62c
pðc [ flgÞ½ujðvc[flgÞ  ujðvcÞ ð6ÞBut (6) coincides with ljðN ; v; pÞ  ljðN ; v; pflgÞ. To prove this, it is sufficient to follow the lines to obtain
equality (5).
To prove uniqueness, suppose that W1 and W2 are two component efficient and fair allocation rules on GN .




c:This proof is adapted from the corresponding one in Calvo et al. (1999).
First, note that jcpj = 0 implies p(;) = 1 and N/p = N.
Then, by the efficiency in connected components, for all k 2 N:W1kðN ; v; pÞ ¼ vðfkgÞ ¼ W2kðN ; v; pÞ:
Let ðN ; v; pÞ be in GN such that, for all q 2 PN with jcqj < jcpj, W1ðN ; v; qÞ ¼ W2ðN ; v; qÞ holds. We must prove
that W1ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ W2ðN ; v; pÞ. Suppose l ¼ fi; jg is a link in cp. We have that W1ðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼ W2ðN ; v; pflgÞ,
as jcpflg j ¼ jcpj  1 < jcpj. Now, as W
1 satisfies fairness:W1i ðN ; v; pÞ W1j ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ W1i ðN ; v; pflgÞ W1j ðN ; v; pflgÞholds:By the induction hypothesis:W1i ðN ; v; pflgÞ W1j ðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼ W2i ðN ; v; pflgÞ W2j ðN ; v; pflgÞ;
552 D. Gómez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 539–556and using the fairness of W2:W2i ðN ; v; pflgÞ W2j ðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼ W2i ðN ; v; pÞ W2j ðN ; v; pÞ:And thus,W1i ðN ; v; pÞ W2i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ W1j ðN ; v; pÞ W2j ðN ; v; pÞ;whenever l ¼ fi; jg 2 cp and therefore, by transitivity, whenever i and j are in the same connected component
C 2 N/p.
So, for all C 2 N/p, there exists dC 2 R such that, for all i 2 C and all C 2 N/p:W1i ðN ; v; pÞ W2i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ dC:Using component efficiency of both W1 and W2, for all C 2 N/p we have:X
i2C
W1i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼
X
i2C
W2i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ vpðCÞ:Hence:0 ¼
X
i2C
W1i ðN ; v; pÞ 
X
i2C
W2i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ dCjCj;and so, dC = 0 and W
1
i ðN ; v; pÞ ¼ W2i ðN ; v; pÞ for all i 2 N. h
Example 5.1. In the generalized probabilistic communication situation in Example 3.2, let us observe that
N/p = {N} and then, the component efficiency property establishes that:X
i
liðN ; v; pÞ ¼ 0:9 ¼ vpðNÞ ¼ ð0:6Þ1þ ð0:3Þ1:Suppose that, as a consequence of the parliamentary dynamic, in the legislative period, party 3 breaks its rela-
tion with party 4. Then, the fairness property says us that both parties must suffer an equal harm. The result-
ing generalized probabilistic communication situation is ðN ; v; pflgÞ, where l ¼ f3; 4g; pflgðf2; 3gÞ ¼ 0:4 and




























Theorem 5.2. The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfying component efficiency and
balanced contributions.
Proof. We only prove that the Myerson value satisfies balanced contributions. The proof of the uniqueness
mimics the corresponding one in the previous theorem.
Let ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN and i; j 2 N . We will prove that:liðN ; v; pÞ  liðN ; v; pjÞ ¼ ljðN ; v; pÞ  ljðN ; v; piÞ:
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X
c2CN
pðcÞliðN ; v; cÞ 
X
c2CNnfjg


























pðc [ dÞ½liðN ; v; c [ dÞ  liðN ; v; cÞ: ð7ÞNow, if c 2 CNn{j} and ; 5 d 2 CNnCNn{j}, then ðN ; v; cÞ ¼ ðN ; v; ðc [ dÞjÞ and thus, liðN ; v; ðc [ dÞjÞ ¼




pðc [ dÞ½ljðN ; v; c [ dÞ  ljðN ; v; ðc [ dÞiÞ:This last expression can be rewritten in the following way:liðN ; v; pÞ  liðN ; v; pjÞ ¼
X
c02CN ;Ljðc0Þ6¼;




pðc0Þ½ljðN ; v; c0Þ  ljðN ; v; c0iÞ; ð8Þthe last equality in (8) holding because, if Li(c 0) = ;, then c = ci and thus:
ljðN ; v; c0Þ  ljðN ; v; c0iÞ ¼ 0:Moreover, the last expression in (8) coincides with:X
c02CN ; Liðc0Þ6¼;
pðc0Þ½ljðN ; v; c0Þ  ljðN ; v; c0iÞ; ð9Þbecause, if Lj(c 0) = ;, then j is an isolated node in both c 0 and c0i, and thus:




pðc [ dÞ½ljðN ; v; c [ dÞ  ljðN ; v; ðc [ dÞiÞ: ð10ÞBut following the lines to obtain the last expression in (7), this last formula (10) coincides with
ljðN ; v; pÞ  ljðN ; v; piÞ. h
Example 5.2. Turning to the situation described in the Example 3.2, suppose an exceptional situation happens
when party 2 plans a constitutional reform that is a very sensitive question in the country. Then party 3, which
absolutely disagrees with this idea, decides to isolate itself. In this case, p3 is given by p3(;) = 1, and so
lðN ; v; p3Þ ¼ ð0; 0; 0; 0Þ. Comparing with the situation in which party 1 breaks its unique link, we have that
the harm suffered by 1 and 3 is the same.l3ðN ; v; pÞ  l3ðN ; v; p1Þ ¼ 0:3 0:1 ¼ 0:2;
l1ðN ; v; pÞ  l1ðN ; v; p3Þ ¼ 0:2 0:0 ¼ 0:2:
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in order to analyze the extent to which these properties hold for the probabilistic Myerson value.
As the fairness property states that, when changing from a generalized probabilistic graph to the subgraph
obtained removing a link, the effect for both incident players is the same, the stability states that, under super-
additiveness, both players lose the same value.
Definition 5.4. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn is stable if, for all ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN such that ðN ; vÞ is a super-
additive game and for any link l ¼ fi; jg with i; j 2 N , it holds that:WkðN ; v; pÞP WkðN ; v; pflgÞ; k ¼ i; j:Theorem 5.3. The Myerson value for generalized probabilistic communication situations is stable.
Proof. From Eq. (5) in the proof of Theorem 5.1, for any link l ¼ fi; jg with i; j 2 N , and for k ¼ i; j:lkðN ; v; pÞ  lkðN ; v; pflgÞ ¼
X
c2CN ;l 62c
pðc [ flgÞðukðvc[flgÞ  ukðvcÞÞ;which is not negative due to the superadditiveness of game v. h
Player anonymity of an allocation rule states that the allocation takes a specific form if the generalized
probabilistic communication situation is player anonymous.
Definition 5.5. A generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ is player anonymous if the value
of a coalition of players in the game vp only depends on the number of players in this coalition who have links
with other players with probability different from zero, i.e., if vp(S) = vp(T) for all S; T  N such that
jS \ NðpÞj ¼ jT \ NðpÞj;NðpÞ being {i 2 N such that it exists j 2 N and c 2Sp with fi; jg 2 cg.Definition 5.6. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn is player anonymous if, for every player anonymous general-
ized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN , there exists a constant a 2 R such that:WiðN ; v; pÞ ¼
a for i 2 NðpÞ;
0 otherwise:

Theorem 5.4. The Myerson value for generalized probabilistic communication situations is player anonymous.
Proof. If ðN ; v; pÞ is player anonymous and i 2 NnN(p), then i is a dummy player in vp and thus,
liðN ; v; pÞ ¼ uiðvpÞ ¼ 0.
On the other hand, any permutation of the players in N(p) does not change the game vp and thus, because of
the symmetry of Shapley value, the result holds. h
Finally, let us consider the superfluous player property and the strong superfluous link property.
Definition 5.7. A player i is superfluous in a generalized probabilistic communication situation ðN ; v; pÞ if the
presence of this player does not influence the value of the game vp, i.e:vpðS [ iÞ ¼ vpðSÞ for all S  N :
An allocation rule satisfies the superfluous player property if the payoffs to the players do not change if
superfluous player isolates itself.
Definition 5.8. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the superfluous player property, if for every
ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN and every player i 2 N who is superfluous in ðN ; v; pÞ, it holds that:WiðN ; v; pÞ ¼ WiðN ; v; piÞ:
D. Gómez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 539–556 555Theorem 5.5. The Myerson value for generalized probabilistic communication situations satisfies the superfluous
player property.












cðS n figÞ ¼ vpiðS n figÞ ¼ vpiðSÞ:This last equality holds because vpiðSÞ ¼ vpiðS n figÞ þ vpiðiÞ ¼ vpiðS n figÞ.
Then, the games ðN ; vpÞ and ðN ; vpiÞ coincide and thus, uðvpÞ ¼ uðvpiÞ. h
Definition 5.9. A link l 2 KN is strongly superfluous in ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN if the removal of this link does not affect
vp, i.e.:vpðSÞ ¼ vplðSÞ for all S  N :Definition 5.10. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the strong superfluous link property if, for every
ðN ; v; pÞ 2 GN and every link l 2 KN that is strongly superfluous in ðN ; v; pÞ, it holds that:WðN ; v; pÞ ¼ WðN ; v; plÞ:
The next theorem trivially holds.
Theorem 5.6. The Myerson value for generalized probabilistic communication situations satisfies the strong
superfluous link property.6. Final remarks
Remark 6.1. It is important to emphasize that the properties defined in this paper (Definitions 5.2–5.4) can be
extended to include more general situations in which they apply.
If we redefine fairness and balanced contributions properties as below, Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 still hold, and
its proofs can be done in a similar way.
Definition 6.1. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the extended fairness property if, for all l ¼ fi; jg with
i; j 2 N and all ðN ; v; pÞ; ðN ; v; qÞ 2 GN such that p{l} = q{l}, being l ¼ fi; jg, the following holds:WiðN ; v; pÞ WiðN ; v; qÞ ¼ WjðN ; v; pÞ WjðN ; v; qÞ:Definition 6.2. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the extended balanced contributions property if, for all
ðN ; v; pÞ; ðN ; v; qÞ and ðN ; v; rÞ 2 GN and all i; j 2 N such that qKNnfig ¼ pKNnfig ; rKNnfjg ¼ pKNnfjg andqðcÞ ¼ rðcÞ for all c 2 CN with LiðcÞ 6¼ ; and LjðcÞ 6¼ ;;
the following holds:WiðN ; v; pÞ WiðN ; v; rÞ ¼ WjðN ; v; pÞ WjðN ; v; qÞ:Definition 6.3. An allocation rule W : GN ! Rn satisfies the extended stability property if, for all
ðN ; v; pÞ; ðN ; v; qÞ 2 GN and any link l ¼ fi; jg with i; j 2 N such that ðN ; vÞ is a super-additive game,
p{l} = q{l}, and p(c [ {l}) P q(c [ {l}) for all c 2 CN with l 62 c, the following holds:WkðN ; v; pÞP WkðN ; v; qÞ; k ¼ i; j:
556 D. Gómez et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 539–556Remark 6.2. It could be interesting to analyze the extent to which the probabilistic Myerson value can be
characterized in terms of the additivity, the component efficiency, the superfluous player, the player anonymity
and the strong superfluous link properties. As it is known, the Myerson value can be characterized using these
properties.
Remark 6.3. Other additional work in this context could be the exploration of calculation methods for this
probabilistic Myerson value and the study and generalization of alternative values for cooperative games with
restricted communication by a network, as the value proposed by Hamiache or the position value.
Remark 6.4. The Myerson value for deterministic communication situations can be used as a measure (with
interesting properties) of the centrality of actors in social networks as in Gómez et al. (2003). It is possible to
adapt and extend the main results in that work to the probabilistic setting defined here. Then we would obtain
a centrality measure for players in a more general class of social networks.
Remark 6.5. In Gómez et al. (2007), a special kind of probabilistic communication situations was used to
introduce a family of cohesiveness measures for groups of actors in social or economic networks. The main
ideas in that work merit, we think, to be extended to the (probabilistic) setting considered in this paper.Acknowledgments
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